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SYMPOSIUM 
PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE OVER 
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY:  THE PERILS AND 
PROMISE OF WHITE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION 
Heidi Kitrosser*
 
 
In March 2009, President Barack Obama issued a memorandum 
instructing the Director of the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop recommendations within 120 days 
“for Presidential action designed to guarantee scientific integrity throughout 
the executive branch.”1  The President contrasted his approach with that of 
the previous administration.  Speaking to the National Academy of Sciences 
in April 2009, he lamented that “we have watched as scientific integrity has 
been undermined and scientific research politicized in an effort to advance 
predetermined ideological agendas.”2  His charge to OSTP, he said, is 
meant “to ensure that federal policies are based on the best and most 
unbiased scientific information . . . [and] that facts are driving scientific 
decisions—and not the other way around.”3  Yet the OSTP 
recommendations, which were due in July 2009, were not issued until 
December 2010.  They amounted to a four-page document that 
commentators deemed vague and insufficiently directive to agencies.4  The 
Obama Administration was also sued under the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) for failing to disclose documents pertaining to the reasons for 
delay.5
 
*  Associate Professor and Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar, University of Minnesota 
Law School.  I would like to thank Aaron Saiger for putting together, and inviting me to 
participate in, a terrific symposium.   
  The Obama White House also claims, like its predecessors, a 
 1. Memorandum on Scientific Integrity from the Administration of Barack H. Obama 
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900137/pdf/DCPD-200900137.pdf [hereinafter 
Scientific Integrity Memo]. 
 2. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Academy of Sciences (Apr. 27, 
2009). 
 3. Id.; see also President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signing an Executive Order 
Removing Barriers to Responsible Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells and a 
Memorandum on Scientific Integrity (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
200900294/pdf/DCPD-200900294.pdf. 
 4. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
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constitutional right to review agency scientific testimony and reports before 
they are publicly disseminated.6  And scientists and open government 
advocates accuse the administration of failing to protect government 
employees who report problems in science-related agencies or programs.7
Citing the apparent discrepancies between the rhetoric and reality of 
scientific integrity in the Obama Administration, Jeff Ruch, the Executive 
Director of the group Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility 
(PEER), observed:  “One of the central tensions in the Obama 
Administration is a rhetorical commitment to transparency and a fanatical 
devotion to message control.  And the two don’t go together.”
 
8  To varying 
degrees, this tension can be found in all modern presidencies.  Like the 
character on The Simpsons who routinely surfaces in political debates to 
implore, “Think of the children!,”9 modern Presidents understand both the 
ease and the political benefit of applauding transparency as an abstract 
proposition.  At the same time, they know that the public will hold them 
and their party responsible, for better or worse, for major national 
developments.  And in this age of the “rhetorical presidency,”10
Conflicts over executive information control cut across substantive 
policy realms.  Such disputes can arise in scenarios ranging from a White 
House claim of executive privilege for its social secretary,
 Presidents 
are expected not only to resolve, but to say all the right things about 
national problems.  It thus is not surprising that modern Presidents 
champion transparency in the abstract while trying to shape public 
perceptions about national events by cloaking and manipulating 
information. 
11 to Justice 
Department motions to dismiss lawsuits against government contractors on 
the basis that litigation could reveal state secrets,12 to presidential claims of 
a constitutional right to preclude agency officials from delivering 
information to Congress or the public before clearing it with the White 
House.13
This Article focuses on the Obama Administration’s relationship to 
scientific information in the administration’s first half (through early 
January 2011, when this Article was completed).  Activities that mix 
politics and science—such as where a policy decision is justified partly by 
scientific conclusions or where scientists assess and report on the efficacy 
 
 
 6. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 105–11 and accompanying text. 
 8. Dan Froomkin, Despite Obama’s Lofty Words, Scientific Integrity Rules Are 
Lagging, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/09/despite-obamas-lofty-word_n_641082.html 
(quoting Jeff Ruch). 
 9. See Helen Lovejoy, SIMPSONS WIKI, http://simpsons.wikia.com/wiki/Helen_Lovejoy 
(identifying the character Helen Lovejoy as the regular speaker of this catchphrase). 
 10. See generally JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987). 
 11. See Michael D. Shear, Government Openness is Tested by Salahi Case, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 4, 2009, at C7. 
 12. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 
97–99, 150–55 (2010). 
 13. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
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of government actions already taken—offer both opportunity and 
temptation for policymakers to shape scientific “facts” to support their 
desired outcomes.  Such information control may entail keeping certain 
facts secret.  It may also involve attempts to manipulate information that 
does get released.14
The first half of the Obama Administration casts the tension between 
abstract support for information integrity and the desire to control 
information in particularly sharp relief.  Campaigning toward the end of the 
Bush Administration, which was frequently called “the most secretive 
administration in our history,”
  I use the term “information control” throughout this 
Article to denote both government secrecy and government efforts to 
manipulate information that the public sees or that select groups (for 
example, congressional committees) receive.  I use the term “information 
integrity” as shorthand for the opposite of information control—that is, for 
a relatively transparent system that seeks to present factual information as 
truthfully as possible.  Scientific integrity is a subset of information 
integrity.  Processes embodying scientific integrity are designed to enable 
expert scientific findings to be presented without extra-scientific 
interference or distortion. 
15 candidate Obama vowed to “run the most 
transparent administration in American history.”16  This promise remained 
a major theme of President Obama’s earliest days in office.  On his first full 
day as President, he issued an executive order broadening public access to 
presidential records,17 a memorandum directing his Attorney General to 
oversee broader compliance with FOIA,18 and a memorandum “direct[ing] 
agencies to harness new technologies to make information available to the 
public and . . . top officials to draft a blueprint Open Government 
Directive.”19
 
 14. For a detailed and insightful study of the many techniques through which scientific 
information can be distorted by the government and by private actors alike, see generally 
THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE:  HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS 
CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH (2008). 
  On March 9, 2009, he issued his scientific integrity directive.  
These early actions and rhetoric appeared to reflect a sense that, at least for 
a moment in time, transparency and information integrity had some real 
political resonance—at minimum, that they excited and mobilized segments 
of the Democratic base. 
 15. Ted Widmer, Making War, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., May 9, 2004, at 7 (reviewing 
BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK (2004)); see also, e.g., JOHN W. DEAN, WORSE THAN 
WATERGATE:  THE SECRET PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH xi (2004); William G. Weaver 
& Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 108 (2005); 
Dorothy Samuels, Editorial, Psst. President Bush Is Hard at Work Expanding Government 
Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A24. 
 16. Justin Rood & Megan Chuchmach, Money, Secrets Top DC Watchdog Worries in 
’09 (Jan. 2, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=6519441 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also, e.g., Obama at 100 Days – 21st Century Right-to-Know Agenda, 
OMB WATCH (Apr. 2009), at 2–3, http://www.ombwatch.org/files/obamaat100daysrtk.pdf. 
 17. Obama at 100 days, supra note 16, at 7. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 3. 
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Analyzing a subset of these events in the Obama Administration’s first 
half—specifically, those involving scientific integrity—sheds light on the 
politics of information integrity, including factors that create windows of 
opportunity for concrete action and change.  Such analysis also illuminates 
the potential of White House administrative directives to enhance 
information integrity and government accountability.  Scientific integrity in 
the Obama Administration also provides a study in the other side of the 
tension between information integrity and information control—that is, the 
gravitational pull of the latter.  As suggested above, the Obama 
Administration has yet to live up to the promise of its March 9, 2009 
directive and related statements.  Considering how and why the 
administration has fallen short in this respect sheds light on a number of 
matters, including the pitfalls of White House administration, the use of 
constitutional theories of preclusive presidential powers to justify White 
House information control, and the tenuousness of transparency’s political 
resonance. 
Part I situates this Article within the broader history and literature of 
White House control of the administrative state and the impact of such 
control on accountability and transparency.  Part II discusses ways in which 
the Obama Administration has fallen short, thus far, in protecting scientific 
integrity.  Part III assesses some positive developments in the Obama 
Administration with respect to scientific integrity.  Part IV considers 
lessons that might be drawn about the relationship between presidential 
administration and scientific integrity from the Obama Administration’s 
first two years.  It concludes that while presidential administration alone is 
insufficient and often counter-productive for fostering information integrity, 
statutory schemes can harness the positive potential of presidential 
administration while imposing checks necessary to curtail its dangers.  Part 
IV also considers related constitutional and political lessons. 
I.  PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY:  SOME 
BACKGROUND 
A.  Developing the Modern Infrastructure of Presidential Administration 
Forrest McDonald has observed that, “[f]rom the point of view of 
administration, the history of the presidency in the twentieth century has 
been the history of presidents’ attempts to gain control of the sprawling 
federal bureaucracy.”20  Early twentieth century Presidents sought to wrest 
control of the administrative state from Congress, which had come to 
dominate administration by the latter half of the nineteenth century.  A 
major focus of these presidential efforts was the budget.21  Prior to the 
passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,22
 
 20. FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:  AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 329 
(1994). 
 there was no such 
 21. Id. at 329–31; see also PERI E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY:  
COMPREHENSIVE REORGANIZATION PLANNING 1905–1996, at 11, 19–21, 27–51 (2d ed. 1998). 
 22. Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921). 
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thing as a centralized federal budget.  Rather, a hodgepodge of statutory 
directives and informal practices dictated the terms through which the 
Treasury Department and individual agencies reported budgetary 
information to Congress, which in turn legislated expenditures through 
similarly disjointed processes.  As President William Taft’s Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency reported to Congress, no one in the administration, 
in Congress, or among the public or press could speak to the overall 
condition of the United States budget or to how different pieces of it 
complemented, duplicated, were inconsistent with, or otherwise related to 
one another.23
In 1912, President Taft presented the Commission’s findings to 
Congress, along with the Commission’s recommendations for a centralized 
federal budgetary process in which the President would play a prominent 
role.
 
24  Under the proposed system, bureaucrats would report budgetary 
information and requests up the chain of command in the executive branch, 
ultimately reaching individual agency heads, the Treasury Secretary, and 
the President.  Drawing from these reports, the Treasury Secretary would, 
under the President’s oversight and direction, draw up a clear and detailed 
budget for congressional consideration.  The Commission also urged the 
creation of a high-level office to assist the President in this process.25  
While Congress initially rejected these proposals as presidential 
overreaching, it largely adopted them several years later in response to 
wartime deficits.  “The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 provided that 
the President, assisted by a new Bureau of the Budget (placed in the 
Treasury Department but understood to have a direct connection to the 
President), would oversee and coordinate all agencies’ budget requests.”26
The next major victory for White House administration occurred during 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Presidency.  With the New Deal having 
expanded an already broad administrative state, FDR sought to redirect 
concerns over a “headless ‘fourth branch’” toward support for greater 
consolidation of federal agencies under presidential control.
 
27  The 
Brownlow Commission, which FDR spearheaded, issued a report 
championing enhanced White House control and responsibility over the 
administrative state.28
 
 23. The Need for a National Budget, 62d Cong. 1–8, 140 (1912) [hereinafter TAFT 
COMMISSION REPORT] (Message from President William Howard Taft transmitting the 
Report of Commission on Economy & Efficiency on the subject of the need for a national 
budget); ARNOLD, supra note 
  The report proposed, among other things, “six new 
assistants to be assigned at presidential discretion.  It also recommended 
21, at 26–51. 
 24. TAFT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 1–8. 
 25. Id. at 7–8, 141–48, 204–06, 217–23. 
 26. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2275 (2001); 
see also ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 53–54; THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 15–16 (1937) [hereinafter BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 27. MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 332–33; see also BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 26, at 2, 43, 47. 
 28. See BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 1–3; ARNOLD, supra note 
21, at 103–07, 116–17; MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 332–34. 
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discretionary funds that would enable the president to acquire more help 
when needed.”  The report also “proposed a major organizational addition 
to the presidency, the Executive Office, with the Bureau of the Budget as its 
centerpiece.”29  The Brownlow Commission and FDR sought new 
legislation to implement these proposals.  Their efforts, however, became 
caught in a political firestorm over fears of a dictatorial presidency.  Such 
fears were compounded by FDR’s simultaneous push to pack the Supreme 
Court.30  Nonetheless, Congress partly relented in 1939, passing a 
Reorganization Act that gave the President some of the new authority that 
he sought.31  The Act gave Roosevelt reorganization powers and authority 
to hire new staff.  Roosevelt used the new authority to “create[] the 
Executive Office of the President” (EOP).  He moved the Bureau of the 
Budget, along with other central planning offices, into the EOP.  He 
followed these changes with an executive order “designat[ing] the formal 
relationships in the Executive Office, the White House Office with its new 
assistants, the Bureau of the Budget, and the remaining components of the 
new presidential establishment.”32
With the beginnings of a White House administrative infrastructure in 
place, and with the public increasingly accepting—even demanding—of 
presidential control over federal programs, the seeds of the modern 
administrative presidency were planted.
 
33  The modern era, generally traced 
back to the Richard M. Nixon Administration, has been characterized by a 
large expansion of the EOP and increasingly aggressive efforts by 
Presidents to shape, curtail, or spur specific agency actions.34  Symbolizing 
the modern approach, the Bureau of the Budget was renamed the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) during the Nixon Administration.  The 
name change signaled the agency’s new role as a clearinghouse not only for 
budgetary decisions but for broader policy matters.  Under President Nixon, 
the OMB was tasked with reviewing certain proposed agency rule-
makings.35  The practice was continued and built upon under Presidents 
Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.  Executive Orders issued by Presidents 
Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush substantially expanded 
the OMB’s review powers over agency rulemakings.36
 
 29. ARNOLD, supra note 
 
21, at 104 (citing BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 
26, at 6–7). 
 30. ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 107–09; MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 333. 
 31. Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, 53 Stat. 565 (1939). 
 32. ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 114. 
 33. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 85–87; MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 332–34; 
Kagan, supra note 26, at 2275. 
 34. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 26, at 2275–82; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The 
Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 701–02, 719–
20 (2007). 
 35. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 20, at 338–39; Kagan, supra note 26, at 2275–76. 
 36. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking:  An Empirical 
Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 824–30 (2003); Kagan, supra note 26, at 2275–82; 
Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking:  The Wrong Way to Write a 
Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1061–63 (1986); Strauss, supra note 34, at 701–02, 
719–20. 
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B. Some Early Discussions of Presidential Administration, Accountability, 
and Transparency 
As far back as the founding, concerns over transparency and 
accountability have been raised by all sides in debates over presidential 
control of administration.37  For example, proponents of ratifying the 
Constitution boasted of its provision for a single President with no 
constitutionally annexed advisory council.  Any wrongful actions by the 
President, they predicted, would be readily tracked and punished, as he 
would have no council behind which to hide.38  Anti-federalists lamented, 
on the other hand, that a council-less President would choose other, less 
visible “‘minions and favourites’” to direct him, making it more difficult to 
track his or their actions.39  Anti-federalists also warned that the council-
less President would himself suffer for want of “‘proper information and 
advice.’”40
Moving ahead to the 20th century, issues of transparency and 
accountability were central foci in two seminal works justifying presidential 
administration—the Taft and Brownlow Commission Reports.
 
41
The Taft Commission Report championed a presidentially prepared 
federal budget as a means to enhance accountability.  President Taft echoed 
the Report’s reasoning in his message transmitting it to Congress.  He 
explained: 
  While 
both commissions were strongly presidentialist in orientation, their reports 
evince some appreciation for the complex relationship between presidential 
administration, transparency, and accountability.  At minimum, each 
reflects an understanding of the political value in invoking transparency and 
checks and balances.  Each report portrays the relationship between 
presidential administration and accountability as a positive one, explaining 
that the more control that the President wields over the administrative state, 
the more that Congress and the people will know who to blame or to credit 
for administrative actions.  Yet neither report assumes that presidential 
control alone is sufficient to create real accountability.  Rather, each 
champions internal and external checking mechanisms to support and 
supplement presidential control.  Both reports deem such mechanisms 
necessary to ensure a flow of accurate information to, within, and from the 
executive branch.  Without this information flow, neither the President, nor 
Congress, nor the people could make well supported judgments or hold 
each other meaningfully to account. 
 
 37. See, Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 607, 623–29, 632–34 (2009). 
 38. Id. at 623–26. 
 39. Id. at 624–26 (quoting 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 44 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990)). 
 40. Id. at 625 (quoting 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 44).  
 41. For references to the reports’ seminal natures, see, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 21, at 
49–51 (describing significance of TAFT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23); id. at 115–17 
(describing significance of BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26); MCDONALD, 
supra note 20, at 331–34 (citing historical roles of both reports). 
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there is at present no provision for reporting revenues, expenditures, and 
estimates for appropriations in such manner that the Executive, before 
submitting estimates, and each Member of Congress, and the people, after 
estimates have been submitted, may know what has been done by the 
Government or what the Government proposes to do.42
 
 
While the Taft Commission Report prescribed greater presidential 
control over appointments and administrative communications with 
Congress,43 it also stressed the need to harness bureaucratic expertise to 
provide an accurate factual picture against which the President, Congress, 
and the public could make and judge decisions.44  What is more, the Report 
emphasized that the budgetary decision-making chain—from bureaucratic 
analyses and recommendations to Presidential budget formation to 
legislative votes—should be transparent.45  The Commission explained that 
“[o]ne of the most important features of [its] recommendation is that which 
requires that every plan to be executed be made an open book, to be read by 
the Congress, by officers of the administration, and by the public.”46
The Brownlow Commission Report echoed and expanded on these 
themes.  The Commission famously observed that “[t]he President needs 
help.”
 
47  It envisioned some of this help taking the form of measures to 
“facilitate the flow upward to the President of information upon which he is 
to base his decisions and the flow downward from the President of the 
decisions once taken for execution by the department or departments 
affected.”48
The Commission also deemed the flow of information outside of the 
executive branch crucial.  It urged: 
 
 
Nothing should be done that would diminish the importance of the work 
of the congressional committees in conducting hearings and pursuing 
investigations.  Time and time again in our history investigations 
conducted by congressional committees have illumined [sic] dark places 
in the Government and in the affairs of the Nation and have resulted in the 
correction of abuses that otherwise might have been undetected for years 
and years.  It is with full realization of the necessity of continuing and 
preserving this important function of the Congress and its committees that 
we suggest the necessity for improving the machinery of holding the 
Executive Branch more effectively accountable to the Congress.49
 
 
 
 42. TAFT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 1 (message from President Taft). 
 43. Id. at 19–22, 143–44, 147–48, 203–05. 
 44. Id. at 139–42, 219–20. 
 45. Id. at 214–23. 
 46. Id. at 221. 
 47. BROWNLOW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 5. 
 48. Id. at 5. 
 49. Id. at 43. 
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Indeed, while the Commission supported the executive branch practice of 
centrally clearing agencies’ legislative proposals,50 it made plain its view 
that Congress must have access to truthful information from throughout the 
executive branch.51
The Brownlow Commission Report also criticized the structure of the 
Comptroller General’s office because the office performed both accounting 
and auditing functions but was not clearly accountable to either the 
President or Congress.  While the Commission deemed accounting an 
executive function that demands accountability to the President, it was 
equally emphatic in its view that auditors must be free from executive 
political controls to ensure the integrity of their work.
 
52
 
  The current 
system, said the Commission: 
deprives the President of essential power needed to discharge his major 
executive responsibility.  Equally important, it deprives the Congress of a 
really independent audit and review of the fiscal affairs of the 
Government by an official who has no voice in administrative 
determinations, which audit is necessary to hold the Administration 
accountable.53
 
 
Relatedly, the Brownlow Commission stressed the importance of neutral 
competence throughout the executive branch.  It argued, for example, that 
“[t]he merit system should be extended upward, outward, and downward to 
include all positions in the Executive Branch of the Government except 
those which are policy-determining in character.”54
C.  Presidential Administration, Accountability, and Transparency:  
Modern Problems and Debates 
 
In recent years, the most prolific proponents of presidential 
administration have been unitary executive theorists, or “unitarians.”55  
Unitarians argue that, as a matter of constitutional law, the President must 
control all discretionary executive activity in the United States.56  Under the 
theory’s strongest version, the President must be able not only to fire 
executive personnel at will but to directly supplant their decisions (with or 
without firing them) with his own decisions.57
 
 50. Id. at 19–20. 
  From this perspective, for 
 51. Id. at 19, 43–44. 
 52. Id. at 15, 20–21. 
 53. Id. at 21. 
 54. Id. at 7. 
 55. “Presidential administration” does not necessarily require the application of unitary 
executive theory.  Indeed, now-Justice Elena Kagan championed “presidential 
administration” in an article of the same name without embracing unitarianism.  See Kagan, 
supra note 26, at 2251, 2320, 2326.  She explained that presidential administration often can 
be supported through statutory interpretation. Id. at 2326–31. 
 56. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:  
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158, 1166 (1992). 
 57. Id. at 1166. 
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example, the President could “at any time substitute his judgment for that of 
the Federal Aviation Administration when the latter acts pursuant to its 
statutory charge to promulgate regulations and minimum safety 
standards.”58
Unitarians typically rely in part on arguments from constitutional text, 
structure, and history.
 
59  Elsewhere, I have challenged the textual, 
structural, and historical arguments, and others have done so as well.60  For 
present purposes, however, a second (though not unrelated)61 set of 
unitarian justifications are most directly relevant.  That is, unitarians 
routinely argue that presidential control enhances government 
accountability.62  “The gist of the accountability argument is that the 
President is the only nationally elected figure in American politics. If he 
controls all law execution in the United States, then the national electorate 
has a clear object of blame or reward for such activity.”63  Relative to 
unelected bureaucrats or the more parochial interests of congressional 
committee members, the President is both uniquely equipped to represent 
the wishes of the national electorate64 and uniquely visible.65
A number of scholars have criticized unitarian claims to accountability.  
For one thing, they deem the unitarian vision of accountability unduly 
simplistic.  Unitarians equate accountability with the placing of thousands 
of administrative decisions—ranging from the high profile to the deeply 
technical and obscure—in the hands of a single person who is subject to 
reelection once.  As critics point out, this vision of accountability is 
inconsistent with the far more complex accountability envisioned by the 
Constitution.  The Constitution, say these critics, creates a web of 
 
 
 58. Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1746 (2009) 
(using this example to illustrate unitary executive theory). 
 59. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 579–82 (1994); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 56, at 
1164–65. 
 60. Kitrosser, supra note 37, at. 607, 618–34 (2009) (challenging unitarian textual, 
structural and historical arguments and citing challenges by other scholars). 
 61. Indeed, I have discussed at length elsewhere connections between the shortcomings 
of “formal” unitarian arguments and those of “functional” unitarian arguments. Id. at 611–
12, 620–21. 
 62. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary 
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 35–37, 45, 59, 65–66 (1995); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, 
Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator, The Framers and the President’s Administrative 
Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 998–99, 1012–15 (1993).  Additionally, at least two scholars 
support unitary executive theory solely on accountability grounds, while disagreeing with 
unitarian arguments from text, structure, and history. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–4, 85–86, 94, 98–99 (1994).  
And Elena Kagan, while not embracing unitary executive theory, touts the relative 
accountability of presidential administration to support her argument for a presumption 
favoring presidential administration in statutory interpretation. See Kagan, supra note 26, at 
2331–39; see also supra note 55. 
 63. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1747 (and sources cited therein). 
 64. Id. at 1747–48 (and sources cited therein). 
 65. See Kagan, supra note 26, at 2337 (making this argument as a policy matter and to 
support her statutory interpretation argument, although Kagan does not embrace unitary 
executive theory as a constitutional matter); see also supra note 55. 
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accountability shared by multiple legislators representing multiple 
constituencies and by the President alike.66  Furthermore, constitutional 
accountability mechanisms are not directed solely toward vindicating 
majority policy preferences (and certainly not toward doing so through the 
instrument of the presidency) but also toward guarding against abuse, 
incompetence, and majoritarian tyranny.67  In the context of the 
administrative state, critics argue, constitutional accountability values 
demand not only multiple avenues for political accountability, but also 
intra-bureaucratic accountability mechanisms characterized by “complex 
chains of authority and expertise.”68
In previous work, I built on these criticisms, explaining that presidential 
administration can often defeat accountability by facilitating information 
control.  Presidential administration can foster information control in 
several ways.  First, it can deepen the reach of politics into bureaucracy and 
hence into scientific research and other forms of fact-finding by subjecting 
those who do research to the risk of politically motivated dismissal or 
reprisal and by subjecting findings themselves to political interference.
 
69  In 
these ways, Presidents and political appointees can manipulate “the very 
factual picture against which the public, Congress, and the courts can judge 
[executive branch] decisions.”70  Second, government researchers may be 
required to clear any public appearances or reports—such as radio or 
television discussions, press releases, or publicly issued studies—with 
agency public affairs officers who themselves are politically appointed or 
subject to politically motivated dismissals, and who are in place partly to 
ensure that any information conveyed is politically “on message.”71  Third, 
government scientists and other agency personnel routinely are required to 
clear congressional testimony, including testimony on scientific research, as 
well as certain other reports with the OMB.72
 
 66. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1785 
(1996) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 
  Fourth, the more deeply and 
58, at 1748–49); Peter M. Shane, Political 
Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances:  The Case of Presidential Review of 
Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197–209 (1995) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 
1749–50); see also Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed:  Against Simple Rules 
for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 992–1007, 1017–20 (1997) (cited in 
Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1749 n.36); Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuring a “Dense 
Complexity”:  Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, ISSUES IN LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP (Mar. 2005), at 12–15, 35–38, (cited in Kitrosser, supra note  58, at 1749 
n.36). 
 67. See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 531, 552–59, 564–65 (1998) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1750); Peter M. 
Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power:  A Constitutional Analysis, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 613–14 (1989) (cited in Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1750). 
 68. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1750 (citing Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability 
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2076–83, 2119–22, 2134–35 
(2005)). 
 69. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 607–10, 640, 643–44, 646–47; see also 
Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1765–74. 
 70. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1769. 
 71. See Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 640 & n.127; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1773–74. 
 72. See Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1772; see also Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, 
Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to the Heads of Departments and 
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ubiquitously that the OMB’s influence and that of high-level political 
appointees reach into the day-to-day work of agencies—including scientific 
research—the more difficult it can be for Congress, courts, or the public to 
discern the nature of that influence.  This blurring of the lines of 
responsibility is due partly to the practical availability of executive 
privilege claims to high-level political officials.73  Such blurring also stems 
from the fact that multiple political actors—including those from the OMB 
and from other high-level political offices—can be involved in any given 
effort to influence agency activity.74  Indeed, it often is unclear whether the 
President himself has any knowledge of alleged high-level political 
interference in agency activities.  Also frequently contested is whether any 
presidential ignorance is incidental or is scrupulously maintained to ensure 
plausible deniability.75
II.  SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND IN THE 
FIRST HALF OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION:  HOW PRESIDENTIAL 
ADMINISTRATION CAN FOSTER INFORMATION CONTROL 
 
Given the degree and blatancy of its attempts to control scientific 
information, the Bush Administration offered some textbook examples of 
political interference in science.  For instance: 
 
[In] a now infamous period in the middle of the Bush administration. . . . 
climate change reports and press releases routinely were edited—
generally by nonscientists, and in one case by a twenty-four-year-old 
political appointee who lacked a college degree—to downplay scientists’ 
conclusions on human-made global warming.  Also in this period, 
scientists for the first time since NASA’s founding in 1958 were required 
to pre-clear media appearances with NASA’s public affairs office.76
 
 
As these and other incidents became publicly known, scientists, open 
government advocates, and other commentators expressed great concern 
over integrity in government science.77
 
Agencies, M-09-09 (Jan. 27, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-09.pdf (informing department and 
agency heads of the “Executive branch’s formal legislative coordination and clearance 
process” detailed in OMB Circular No. A-19; OMB Circular No. A-19 (1979), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a019/) (detailing process by which agencies must 
submit testimony and reports to the OMB for “coordination and clearance”). 
  Promises to restore information 
 73. See Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 609, 654–55; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1763–64, 
1766–69. 
 74. See Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 638–40, 655; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1765. 
 75. See Kitrosser, supra note 37, at 638, 654–56; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1763–69. 
 76. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1773 (citing MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE:  INSIDE 
THE POLITICAL ATTACK ON DR. JAMES HANSEN AND THE TRUTH OF GLOBAL WARMING 15–17, 
34, 36, 49–50, 56, 67–68, 81, 93–94, 116–17, 119, 123–28, 136, 140–41 (2009)). 
 77. See, e.g., infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. See generally TIMOTHY 
DONAGHY ET AL., ATMOSPHERE OF PRESSURE:  POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN FEDERAL 
CLIMATE SCIENCE (2007); THE SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY PROGRAM OF THE UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, INTERFERENCE AT THE EPA:  SCIENCE AND POLITICS AT THE U.S. 
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integrity, including scientific integrity, were significant themes in the 
presidential campaign and early presidency of Barack Obama.78
The backlash against scientific information control in the Bush 
Administration is a politically important phenomenon.  In Part III, I provide 
more detail on manifestations of that backlash in the Obama campaign and 
administration, and in Part IV I elaborate on what we may learn from the 
backlash and its manifestations.  It is equally important, however, to assess 
and to learn from respects in which the Obama Administration’s actions 
thus far have fallen short of its rhetoric and have even helped to further 
entrench information control.  The remainder of Part II provides examples 
of such shortcomings in the Obama Administration’s first half, and Part IV 
draws lessons from the same. 
 
A.  Scientific Integrity Directive 
As noted in the Introduction, President Obama gave a much ballyhooed 
directive to the OSTP in March 2009 to develop recommendations by July 
9, 2009 “for Presidential action designed to guarantee scientific integrity 
throughout the executive branch.”79
First, the few vague explanations for the enormous delay that have been 
offered as of early January 2011 suggest that much of the hold-up occurred 
in the OMB.  While OSTP Director John Holdren has provided little 
explanation for the delay, he did note in a June 2010 blog post that OSTP 
and OMB had received draft recommendations from “an interagency panel 
with representatives from all of the major science offices and agencies,” and 
that the two offices had “over the intervening months . . . been honing a 
final set of recommendations.”
 Yet the recommendations were not 
issued until December 17, 2010, more than quintupling the time-frame 
outlined by the President.  While a long delay of any initiative invites 
criticism, several features of this delay and of the December 17 
recommendations suggest problems specific to information integrity, and 
scientific integrity in particular, in the executive branch. 
80  Similarly, the bits of information 
available as of January 2011 from a heavily redacted set of inter-agency 
correspondence disclosed pursuant to a FOIA request suggest that OMB 
was a major bottleneck.81
 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2008), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/interference-at-the-epa.pdf. 
  While virtually nothing has been disclosed as of 
 78. See infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. 
 79. Scientific Integrity Memo, supra note 1; see also Complaint at 1–2, PEER v. OSTP, 
(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2010) (No. 110-cv-01762) available at 
http://peer.org/docs/dc/10_19_10_OSTP_FOIA_Complaint_Final.pdf. 
 80. John Holdren, Ask Dr. H:  “Where Are We on Scientific Integrity?”, OSTP BLOG 
(June 18, 2010, 8:21 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/18/ask-dr-h-where-are-
we-scientific-integrity. 
 81. White House Office of Sci. and Tech., Talking Points, 2010 doc set at 
PEERvOSTP000146-47, available at http://www.peer.org/docs/doc/12_22_10_—
2010_OSTP_docs.pdf (document dated July 9, 2010, reporting agreement between OSTP 
and OMB “on penultimate language”); id. at PEERvOSTP000151, 156 (documents dated 
July 19, 2010, referencing upcoming meeting between Holdren and OMB Director Peter 
Orszag); White House Office of Sci. and Tech., Talking Points, 2009 doc set at 
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yet regarding the substance of OMB’s concerns, it seems intuitive that 
OMB would have been concerned over the prospect of losing some of its 
longstanding power to clear agencies’ scientific testimony and certain 
scientific reports for dissemination.82  Indeed, the December 2010 
recommendations do “not challenge the long-standing practice of OMB 
review of testimony, nor [do they] question OMB’s role in reviewing 
agency scientific findings, regulations, and information collections—
activities that allow OMB to inject political considerations into scientific 
and technical matters.”83  What is more, the recommendations state that 
they are not intended to affect the OMB when the latter performs functions 
“relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.”84
Second, while the December recommendations have some merit, as 
discussed in Part III, for the most part they are short and relatively vague 
statements of principle on which individual agencies are to base their own, 
presumably more detailed guidelines.
 
85
 
PEERvOSTP000065, 67, available at http://www.peer.org/docs/doc/
12_22_10_2009_OSTP_docs.pdf (document dated June 29, 2009, stating that “OSTP staff 
are working closely with OMB to revise the proposed recommendations to the President”); 
id. at PEERvOSTP000018-20 (document dated June 29, 2009, explaining that “OSTP and 
OMB continue to negotiate a handful of remaining fine points”); id. at PEERvOSTP000031 
(document dated July 10, 2009, stating “Latest draft of Holdren response to the 
memorandum was sent to OMB for review on July 9th”).  See also News Release, PEER, 
Science Transparency Policy Swathed in Secrecy (Dec. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1438 (describing thin document disclosure 
from OSTP and apparent hold-ups in discussions between OSTP and OMB); Dan Froomkin, 
New Obama Scientific Integrity Memo is Late and Vague, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 3, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/17/new-obama-scientific-inte_n_798483.html 
(updating a posting first dated December 17, 2010, Froomkin writes of the disclosed 
documents, “[t]he vast majority of the 155 pages were blacked out, but they indicated that 
the guidance had been derailed by the [OMB]”).  
  This fact, too, lends credence to the 
theory that the four page document was delayed due not to wrangling over 
nuances of language or other fine points, but to reluctance by political 
appointees to relinquish control over information.  Indeed, the fact that the 
 82. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (referencing that power and some of its 
sources). 
 83. Press Release, OMB Watch, OMB Watch Sees White House Science Memo as a 
Step Forward, (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11423; see also 
Memorandum on Scientific Integrity from John P. Holdren for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies (Dec. 17, 2010), at pt. V [hereinafter John Holdren Scientific 
Integrity Memo] available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/
ostp/scientific-integrity-memo-12172010.pdf . 
 84. John Holdren Scientific Integrity Memo, supra note 83, at pt. V(ii). 
 85. See, e.g., Kenneth Chang, White House Issues Long-Delayed Science Guidelines, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, at A13 (quoting environmental studies Professor Roger A. 
Pielke, Jr. to the effect that “‘[t]he guidelines are substantively quite thin’” and that because 
they are merely “‘a starting line for agencies to consider these issues, what is surprising is 
how long it took to get [them] out’”); News Release, Public Employees for Environmental 
Responsibility, New Obama Scientific Integrity Guidance:  Timid, Torn, and Tardy (Dec. 
20, 2010), available at http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1437 (calling 
document “vague and contradictory” and quoting PEER executive director Jeff Ruch as 
saying, “‘[t]his guidance was almost two years in the making but it reads like it was finalized 
at the last minute’”). 
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memorandum leaves “enormous discretion” to all affected agencies86
 
 
suggests that the OMB was not alone in fearing loss of information control.  
PEER offers some examples of the discretion with which OSTP leaves 
agencies.  It observes: 
Despite its lengthy gestation, the memo sidesteps several critical topics, 
including: 
Whether alterations of scientific and technical papers and the reasons for 
those changes will be part of a public record or whether these rewrites 
will remain secret; 
Whether non-scientist senior managers may alter scientific documents for 
non-technical reasons.  The memo only forbids alterations by “political 
officials” and “public affairs officers.” Thus, for example, alterations of 
Arctic offshore drilling reviews by non-scientist managers as documented 
in an April 2010 Government Accountability Office report may not be 
prohibited; and 
The memo once mentions adoption of “appropriate whistleblower 
protections” but does not say what is “appropriate” or even what 
specialists will be allowed to blow the whistle.  It concludes by stipulating 
that nothing in the memo created any “substantive or procedural” right 
against a federal agency or officer, suggesting any new protections may 
only be rhetorical.87
 
 
Finally, as of January 2011, the administration has hardly been 
forthcoming about the reasoning and dialogue behind the recommendations 
or their delay.  PEER filed a FOIA request with OSTP on August 11, 2010, 
seeking “all comments, communications and recommendations developed 
between OSTP and executive departments and agencies, related to the 
proposed policies and any explanations of OSTP’s delay in publishing these 
policies in accordance with the President’s timeline.”88  On October 19, 
2010, PEER filed suit under FOIA in federal district court for the same 
information.89  On December 22, 2010, OSTP disclosed 155 pages of 
documents, most of which are blacked out.90
 
 86. Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity Directive 
“Articulates a Broad Vision for Defending Science from Political Interference,” (Dec. 17, 
2010), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/scientific-integrity-directive-
0484.html (quoting UCS’ Dr. Francesco Grifo as deeming the recommendations a 
“‘promising blueprint’” but noting that “‘[a]t the same time, I’m worried that the directive 
leaves an enormous amount of discretion to the agencies’”); see also, e.g., Froomkin, supra 
note 
  According to PEER, “all of 
the meeting notes, progress reports and even congressional testimony were 
81 (noting concerns of scientists and advocates over discretion left to agencies). 
 87. Press Release, PEER, supra note 85. 
 88. Complaint, supra note 79 at 1–2. see also id. at 5. 
 89. Id at 1–3, 5–6, 16–23; see also Press Release, PEER, Lawsuit to Expose Cause of 
Scientific Integrity Rules Holdup, (Oct. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1414. 
 90. See supra note 81 (citing to PEER and Dan Froomkin’s descriptions of the disclosed 
documents and to some of the documents themselves). 
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heavily redacted.”91  PEER wrote on December 22, 2010 that it continued 
to seek information, including:  “What were the thorny issues that dragged 
out and diluted the OSTP process; Which agencies voiced what specific 
objections and concerns; and How did OMB affect the drafting of guidance 
and what role will it continue to play”?92
B.  Administration Practices and Legal Claims 
 
Perhaps more telling than the saga of the scientific integrity guidelines 
are the practices in which the administration has engaged and the legal 
claims that it has made over the past two years.  Examples demonstrate that 
the Obama Administration, like past administrations, is not immune to the 
pull to control scientific information, or to leave open avenues and legal 
justifications for so doing.  To be clear, these examples are not 
comprehensive, and they are not meant to paint a complete picture of the 
Obama Administration’s relationship to scientific integrity.  They are meant 
simply to illustrate that presidential administration can undermine scientific 
integrity and some key means by which it can do so.  Additionally, they 
demonstrate that threats to scientific integrity—while varying in 
manifestation and degree—cut across administrations and parties.  Such 
continuities call to mind James Madison’s admonition that humans are 
neither angels nor governed by angels.93  Or, more to the point, as Dr. 
Francesca Grifo of the Union of Concerned Scientists cautioned shortly 
after President Obama’s inauguration, in the face of high expectations from 
scientists around the country:  “Just because we have well-meaning smart 
people in there now doesn’t mean [that events like those in the Bush 
Administration] can’t happen again.”94
With respect to its legal arguments, the Obama Administration has 
echoed previous administrations in taking the view that the President has an 
exclusive constitutional prerogative to control communications between 
executive branch employees and Congress.  In a signing statement, 
President Obama flagged the narrow construction that he would accord a 
statutory provision that “prohibit[s] the use of appropriations to pay the 
salary of any Federal officer or employee who interferes with or prohibits 
certain communications between Federal employees and Members of 
Congress.”
 
95
 
 91. Press Release, PEER, supra note 
  The President indicated that he would “not interpret this 
provision to detract from [his] authority to direct the heads of executive 
departments to supervise, control, and correct employees’ communications 
with the Congress in cases where such communications would be unlawful 
or would reveal information that is properly privileged or otherwise 
81. 
 92. Id. 
 93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 239 (James Madison) (Hallowell et al. eds., 1857).  
 94. Gardiner Harris & William J. Broad, Scientists Welcome Administration’s Words but 
Must Wait for Action, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A23. 
 95. Presidential Statement on Signing the Omnibus Appropriations Act (Mar. 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900145/pdf/DCPD-200900145.pdf. 
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confidential.”96
In practice, the Obama Administration has indeed followed the lead of 
past administrations in requiring testimony and certain other reports to be 
cleared by OMB.
  As it relates to scientific integrity, this view would protect 
the President’s ability to continue to direct the OMB in its longstanding role 
vetting agency testimony, including that of a scientific nature.  This position 
similarly would protect the President’s ability to have the vetting function 
performed by individual agency heads. 
97  In one recent, high profile case involving the BP oil 
spill, OMB’s vetting process might have compromised scientific integrity.  
In an October 2010 working paper on the spill, the staff of the National 
Commission investigating the incident (the National Commission on the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling) addressed the 
government’s early estimates of the oil flow rate, which were later found to 
have been inaccurately low.98  The Commission staff was informed that, 
shortly after the spill, “NOAA [the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration] wanted to make public some of its long-term, worst-case 
discharge models for the . . . spill,” but OMB denied its request to do so.99  
The White House, OMB, and NOAA have denied any improper 
interference by OMB.100  Furthermore, the final Commission Report, 
released on January 11, 2011, neither repeats nor retracts the claim about 
OMB interference.  The final report simply does not mention it.  The final 
report does elaborate on the unrealistically low nature of the government’s 
original public estimates.  The report recounts a statement at a press 
conference by Admiral Mary Landry on April 28 that “‘NOAA experts 
believe that the output could be as much as 5000 barrels [per day].’”101  
The report notes that “5,000 barrels per day was a back-of-the-envelope 
estimate,” but that it “remained the official government estimate of the spill 
size” for the next four weeks.102  By the time that the final report was 
issued, the government’s estimate had climbed to “about 60,000 barrels per 
day.”103
Regardless of what transpired at OMB in late April regarding flow-rate 
estimates, the controversy reminds us of the risk that scientific estimates or 
other analysis can become compromised in the process of political pre-
clearance.  Furthermore, the lack of clarity as to what happened between 
 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See supra note 72 (citing to current clearance directives). 
 98. The Amount and Fate of the Oil 1–8, 14–16 (Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Working Paper No. 3, 2010). 
 99. Id. at 10. 
 100. See, e.g., Ben Gemen, OMB Denies Report It May Have Suppressed Data During 
BP Spill, E2 WIRE, THE HILL’S ENERGY & ENVIRONMENTAL BLOG (Oct. 6, 2010, 3:46 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/677-e2-wire/123041-white-house-denies-it-suppressed-oil-
flow-data. 
 101. FINAL COMM’N REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 
AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEPWATER:  THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING 135 (2010), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdf_final/DEEPWATER_ReporttothePresident_FINAL.pdf. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 146; see also id. at 167 (breaking down the numbers a bit further). 
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OMB and NOAA reflects the broader difficulty of determining who did 
what and when in interactions between the OMB and other agencies.104
Political clearance requirements and constitutional arguments defending 
them also have serious implications for the protection of scientific and other 
whistleblowers.  These implications are illuminated by the testimony of 
Rajesh De, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Policy, speaking on behalf of the Obama Administration 
regarding proposed new whistleblower protections.  While expressing 
strong general support for protecting whistleblowers, De objected to 
provisions that would enable whistleblowers to share classified or 
privileged information with Congress without executive branch approval.  
Such provisions, De said, “would unconstitutionally restrict the ability of 
the President to protect from disclosure information that would harm 
national security” or undermine executive privilege.
 
105  De also expressed 
concern over provisions that would enable federal juries to order the 
reinstatement of individuals who had lost their government jobs after their 
security clearances were stripped for retaliatory reasons.  “Providing a 
judicial remedy” in such cases, said De, “even one that does not mandate 
restoration of the [security] clearance, is inconsistent with the traditional 
deference afforded Executive Branch decision-making in this area.”106
 
 104. Another post-oil spill incident also reflects the risks to scientific accuracy when 
statements get filtered through White House offices.  On August 4, 2010, Carol Browner, 
director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy (OECCP), told 
major news outlets that “‘the vast majority’ . . . of the oil ‘is gone’ or ‘appears to be gone.’” 
Id.  Previously, however, NOAA had privately expressed disagreement with this assessment 
in an e-mail to Browner’s deputy. Id. at 168.  Later on August 4th, Browner, speaking at a 
press briefing, said that the report that she had cited on the oil’s fate had been “subjected to a 
scientific protocol, which means you peer review, peer review, and peer review.” Id. at 168.  
Earlier in the same briefing, NOAA’s administrator had also deemed the report peer 
reviewed. Id.  Outside scientists quickly criticized the report as premature, “especially 
because of the uncertain rate of [the oil’s] biodegradation.” Id.  It also soon came to light, 
and NOAA acknowledged, that the report had not yet been peer reviewed at the time of 
Browner’s announcements.  Indeed, a final, peer reviewed report was not available until 
November 23, 2010. Id. at 168–69.  Browner’s mistake, of course, was remedied quickly 
through the responses of outside scientists.  Yet in less high profile cases, White House 
mistakes in presenting scientific information may not be caught nearly so readily.  
Furthermore, Browner’s error highlights the political motivations that can push White House 
officials to place the most positive (or otherwise politically desirable) public spin on a 
scientific matter.  Such error may be entirely unintentional.  Regardless, such a mistake 
highlights the importance of transparency so that external forces may catch errors, as 
happened here, as well as internal procedures facilitating review and push-back by 
government scientists.  Indeed, at the same August 4 afternoon press briefing in which 
Browner appeared, NOAA Director Jane Lubchenco, a marine scientist and environmental 
ecologist, also appeared and expressed reservations about Browner’s optimistic numbers. 
The Amount and Fate of the Oil, supra note 
 
98, at 21.  A system of rigid, top-down clearance 
for press appearances might well have prevented Lubchenco’s statement. 
 105. The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009:  Hearing on H.R. 1507 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov. Reform, 111th Cong. 66 (2009) (statement of 
Ragish De, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Policy, Dep’t of Justice); The 
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2009, Hearing on S.372 Before the Oversight 
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 41, (2009) (Statement of 
Ragish De, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Policy, Dep’t of Justice). 
 106. Hearing on S. 372 at 39; Hearing on H.R. 1507 at 68. 
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Additionally, whistleblower rights groups have expressed alarm over the 
Obama Administration’s aggressive approach to whistleblower cases, 
including those involving science agencies or scientific information.  For 
example, Justice Department lawyers have continued to defend the Bush 
Administration’s firing of former U.S. Park Police Chief Teresa Chambers.  
The U.S. Park Police is situated within the Interior Department and 
Chambers is represented in her legal defense by PEER.107  Chambers was 
fired at least partly for conveying safety and budgetary concerns to the 
Washington Post without authorization.108  Justice Department lawyers 
argued in their 2009 brief to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit that the Bush Administration properly charged Chambers for, 
among other things, “disclos[ing] budget information in violation of a 
directive of the [OMB]” and “disclos[ing] security information relating to 
the deployment of Park Police.”109
Science agency employees and scientific information are also impacted 
by the Obama Administration’s unprecedented push to criminally prosecute 
government employees who leak classified information.
 
110  Much classified 
information, after all, involves scientific matters ranging from weapons 
engineering to the efficacy of electronic surveillance methods to chemical 
production hazards.  One prosecution initiated by the Obama 
Administration, for example, targets computer software expert Thomas 
Drake, who reportedly conveyed to his bosses at the National Security 
Agency (NSA), the NSA Inspector General, the Defense Department’s 
Inspector General, the congressional intelligence committees, and the 
Baltimore Sun, his concerns that the NSA was investing large amounts of 
money in inefficient and unwieldy intelligence management systems while 
overlooking more effective and more privacy-protective programs.111
 
 107. See Press Release, PEER, Chambers Wins Appeal Over Removal as U.S. Park 
Police Chief (Apr. 21, 2010), available at http://www.peer.org/
news/news_id.php?row_id=1336. 
 
 108. Chambers v. Dep’t of Interior, 602 F.3d 1370, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 109. Brief of Respondent at 14–15, Chambers v. Dep’t. of Interior, 602 F.3d 1370 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (No. 2009–3120), 2009 WL 3044489. 
 110. See Heidi Kitrosser, Supremely Opaque?:  Accountability, Transparency, and 
Presidential Supremacy, 5 ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2011) (describing 
the large uptick in prosecutions and criminal investigations for leaking classified information 
in the Obama Administration); see also Charlie Savage, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Named in 
Disclosure Indictment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2011, at A15 (describing new leak indictment 
issued in early January 2011, and noting that the indictment “is the fifth case during the 
Obama administration in which a current or former government official has been charged in 
connection with a leak investigation”). 
 111. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Obama Steps up Prosecution of Leaks to the News Media, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, at A1; Scott Shane, Former N.S.A. Official is Charged in Leaks 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at A18. 
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III.  SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION:  HOW PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION CAN HELP TO 
FACILITATE INFORMATION INTEGRITY 
Presidential administration and scientific integrity are not always 
antithetical to each other.  While the President and his advisers have 
substantial capacity to act in secret and incentives to manipulate facts, they 
also have unrivaled access to national and international stages and 
incentives to appear forthcoming.  The tools of presidential administration 
thus can be used to bolster, as well as to compromise, information integrity. 
The Obama Administration’s first half provides some evidence of 
presidential administration’s potential to positively impact information 
integrity, while also demonstrating its ability to do just the opposite. 
Indeed, disappointment over the lethargy of the White House’s scientific 
integrity efforts should not obscure the lessons to be gleaned from the very 
fact that the scientific integrity initiative, and related pledges of 
transparency and information integrity, formed so prominent a part of the 
Obama campaign and the administration’s early days.  Candidate Obama 
repeatedly promised to run “the most transparent administration in 
American history,”112 and on his first full day in office issued an executive 
order and two memoranda directed toward increasing government 
transparency.113  He and his advisers also emphasized their commitment to 
scientific integrity throughout the presidential campaign and from the 
earliest moments of the administration, including the inaugural address. 114
As a matter of politics, these aspects of the Obama candidacy and 
administration reflect two larger phenomena.  First, it is hard to go wrong, 
politically, praising concepts like transparency and scientific integrity in the 
abstract.  While polling responses become more mixed as questions get 
more specific—as Americans are asked, for example, whether national 
security information should be protected—Americans express support for 
transparency and related concepts in the abstract.
 
115
Second, there are moments in history in which the political momentum to 
strengthen protections for oft-cited values like the rule of law and 
 
 
 112. See Rood & Chuchmach, supra note 16. 
 113. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
 114. See, e.g., Brian Beary, Top Obama Official Reaffirms Commitment to Cap and 
Trade, EUROPOLITIC ENV’T, Jan. 22, 2009; Katherine Boyle, EPA:  Obama Vowed To 
Increase Agency Funding, Protect Scientific Integrity, GREENWIRE, Nov. 7, 2008; Harris & 
Broad, supra note 94, at A23; Alex Kaplun, Senate Confirms Energy, Interior, USDA 
Secretaries, But Delays on EPA, CEQ Heads, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY, Jan. 21, 2009; 
Science Debate 2008 at question no. 12 and corresponding answers, SCIENCEDEBATE, 
http://www.sciencedebate.org/debate08.html. 
 115. See, e.g., 2009 Sunshine Week Survey About Public Attitudes Toward Government 
Secrecy, http://www.opengovva.org/virginias-foia-resources/sunshine-week/1165?
task=view; State of the First Amendment 2008, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER, at 5, available at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/pdf/SOFA2008survey.pdf; First Amendment Center 
and the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Government Secrecy Poll, Mar. 7, 2005, at 
1–2; The Bush Administration’s Secrecy Policy:  A Call to Action to Protect Democratic 
Values, OMBWATCH Part III:  Research:  What the American Public Believes (Oct. 24, 
2002), http://www.ombwatch.org/node/639. 
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transparency are enhanced.  In the wake of Watergate and other abuse-of-
power scandals, for example, landmark hearings were held and laws passed 
by Congress, including amendments to strengthen FOIA that were passed 
over President Ford’s veto.116  Presidents are well-positioned to harness and 
to benefit from such moments politically, particularly if they replace 
administrations perceived as scandal-ridden or unduly opaque.117
Candidate and then President Obama’s early words and deeds, and the 
reaction to the same by scientists and transparency advocates, suggest an 
initial sense among a subset of the President’s political base and perhaps on 
the President’s part that such a moment had arrived for scientific integrity 
and transparency.  For example, a New York Times article referred to recent 
“wounds to scientific integrity that President Obama promised to heal in his 
Inaugural Address.”
 
118  The article added that “[t]he quickest-acting balm 
was the change of tone, delivered instantly in the speech.”119  It also cited 
government scientists who “reported being teary-eyed with joy” at the 
change in administrations and what it could mean for scientific integrity.120  
Relatedly, the group openthegovernment.org wrote that “[t]he elections of 
2008 were viewed by many as a referendum on the secrecy and 
unaccountability of the Bush Administration, and the country elected a 
President who has promised the most open, transparent and accountable 
federal Executive Branch in history.”121
Furthermore, President Obama’s early words and pledges, including the 
2009 scientific integrity memorandum, appear to have had some influence 
within agencies.  While the picture is not all bright—for example, some 
agencies still require scientists to pre-clear even unofficial public 
communications relevant to their work with public affairs officers
 
122
 
 116. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, National Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 
CONST. COMMENT. 483, 496–97 (2010); Veto Battle 30 Years Ago Set Freedom of 
Information Norms, NAT’L SECURITY ARCHIVE, Electronic Briefing Book No. 142 (Nov. 23, 
2004), http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB142/index.htm. 
—
 117. This notion calls to mind political scientist Stephen Skowronek’s concept of a 
“reconstruction” president.  Such a “president heralds from the opposition to the previously 
established regime, and pre-established commitments of ideology and interest have, in the 
course of events, become vulnerable to direct repudiation as failed or irrelevant responses to 
the problems of the day.” STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 36 (1997).  
Skowronek calls the “politics of reconstruction” the “most promising of all situations for the 
exercise of political leadership” by presidents. Id. at 37.  Of course, Skowronek also 
observes that modern reconstruction presidents may have more trouble distinguishing 
themselves from their predecessors than they did in the past, due to the thickening of the 
institutional apparatus that surrounds the presidency. Id. at 55–57.  Skowronek’s analysis 
provides a helpful lens for considering both the reconstruction rhetoric of candidate and 
President Obama regarding scientific integrity, as well as the uneven and at times counter-
productive nature of his administration’s actions and claims with respect to scientific 
integrity. 
 118. Harris & Broad, supra note 94, at A23. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Secrecy Report Card, 2010, OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, 
http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SecrecyRC_2010.pdf, at 3. 
 122. See, e.g., Press Release, PEER, Lift Gag Order Muzzling NOAA Scientists, (July 12, 
2010), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1372 (discussing Department of 
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some headway has been made since President Obama took office.  For 
instance, scientific integrity groups lavished praise on Interior Secretary 
Ken Salazar for a September 2010 order directing his department to create a 
scientific integrity policy.  The Union of Concerned Scientists, while 
cautioning that a policy with clear rules and time-frames must soon follow, 
approvingly describes the order as stating among other things that the 
Interior Department will “protect whistleblowers who expose the misuse of 
scientific information[] and clarify government scientists’ right to share 
their research and scientific analyses with the public and the press.”123  The 
Interior order presumably was meant in part as a response to the 
Administration’s March 2009 memorandum.124  Furthermore, the order was 
responsive to recent criticisms, both internal and external, of the 
Department.  An earlier, considerably weaker draft was roundly panned by 
scientific integrity groups.125  And an April 2010 Inspector General report 
was highly critical of the Department for its approach to scientific integrity 
and its lack of a policy.126
Additionally, while aspects of the administration’s response to the BP oil 
spill have rightly been criticized, it also must be noted that some of what we 
now know about that response—including the possibility, noted in Part II, 
that OMB prevented NOAA from releasing worst case scenario flow rate 
estimates—we know due to the work of a commission created by President 
Obama through executive order.
 
127
 
Commerce, Office of Management and Organization, Public Communications Policy, DAO 
219-1, effective Apr. 30, 2008, at §§ 6–7, 11, 
http://www.osec.doc.gov/omo/dmp/daos/dao219_1.html); see also, e.g., Press Release, 
PEER, Forest Cops Chafe Under Tight Media Muzzle (Apr. 21, 2010), 
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1335 (describing similar directive within 
US Forest Service); Press Release, PEER, Obama Gag Order on Federal Workers Like 
Those Under Bush (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1298 
(same). 
  Of course, one should not be naïve in 
assessing the truth-finding value of presidential commissions where 
government wrongdoing may be at issue.  Such commissions can, after all, 
be handy means to stave off or deflect attention from more damaging 
 123. Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Science Group Praises New 
Department of Interior Scientific Integrity Policy as a Great First Step; Calls for Department 
to Furnish Details and Deadlines (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.ucsusa.org/
news/press_release/science-group-praises-new-0457.html; see also Secretary of Interior, 
Order No. 3305, Ensuring Scientific Integrity Within the Department of the Interior (Sept. 
29, 2010), http://elips.doi.gov/app_so/act_getfiles.cfm?order_number=3305 [hereinafter 
Order No. 3305]; Press Release, PEER, Interior Makes Big Stride on Scientific Integrity 
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1409. 
 124. See Order No. 3305, supra note 123, at § 2. 
 125. See, e.g., Press Release, PEER, Interior Posts Only Half of a Scientific Integrity 
Policy (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=1396. 
 126. See generally Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Evaluation 
Report:  Interior Lacks a Scientific Integrity Policy, Report No. WR-EV-MOA-0014-2009 
(Apr. 2010), available at http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/
ScientificIntegrityPolicy.pdf. 
 127. Press Release, White House, Weekly Address:  President Obama Establishes 
Bipartisan National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling (May 22, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-
president-obama-establishes-bipartisan-national-commission-bp-deepwa. 
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inquiries.128
A.  Reflections on the Past Two Years 
  Yet the commission staff’s finding about the flow rate 
estimate illustrates that there are limits on the extent to which political 
actors can control investigative mechanisms once they are in place.  
Political incentives can, in short, lead Presidents to announce inquiries or 
otherwise to take pro-transparency actions that—despite presidential 
intentions to keep such activities within tight confines—take on lives of 
their own. 
The story of scientific integrity in the first two years of the Obama 
Administration supports several propositions relating to constitutional law, 
politics, and constitutional politics.  I group those points into three big-
picture lessons on which I elaborate below.  The first lesson is that 
presidential administration is not an unequivocally good thing for 
accountability, given its capacity to foster information control.  Certainly, 
presidential administration can conduce to accountability under certain 
conditions, but whether and when it does so is a very fact-dependent matter.  
Furthermore, some of the conditions that conduce to accountability may 
violate perfect unity, even if they are consistent with aspects of presidential 
administration.  These points have negative implications for unitary 
executive theory’s major functional justification, which is that unity 
enhances accountability.  Second, if Congress indeed has the constitutional 
flexibility that I and others have argued it does to structure the bureaucracy 
and to protect information integrity, the question that remains is how 
Congress might use that leeway to foster scientific integrity in government.  
The events and patterns of the past two years and beyond suggest that 
Congress would be well advised to harness the positive potential of 
presidential administration while supplementing and checking it through 
statutory direction and constraint.  For example, Congress might give the 
President a wide berth within which to create open government initiatives, 
while imposing protective statutory floors such as whistleblower rights to 
report directly to Congress, prohibitions on non-scientists pre-clearing 
scientific reports, and greater documentation regarding White House 
involvement in decisionmaking.  The third lesson begins with the 
assessment that both the Obama Administration and Congress failed, over 
the past two years, to take full advantage of the political backlash against 
information control sparked during the Bush Administration.  From there, I 
 
 128. See, e.g., KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT 49 (1996) 
(describing President Ford’s appointment of a commission headed by Vice President 
Rockefeller as a means to “preempt a congressional inquiry” into recent scandals).  In an 
amusing example of the Rockefeller Commission’s attempt to head off embarrassing 
disclosures, a book recounts the following: 
After [CIA Director] Colby’s second or third appearance before the commission 
investigators, Rockefeller drew Colby aside and said, ‘Bill, do you really have to 
present all this material to us?  We realize there are secrets that you fellows need to 
keep, and so nobody here is going to take it amiss if you feel there are some 
questions you can’t answer quite as fully as you seem to feel you have to.’ 
ANGUS MACKENZIE, SECRETS:  THE CIA’S WAR AT HOME 62 (1997). 
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offer some thoughts on how political momentum toward information 
integrity might be better seized, and even created, in the future. 
B.  Lesson #1:  Accountability Is No Simple Thing (or Why Unity and 
Accountability Do Not Always Mix, and the Constitutional Implications 
Thereof) 
As noted in Part II, I have elsewhere critiqued unitary executive theory.  
To briefly summarize those critiques:  constitutional text, structure, and 
history do not demand a fully unitary executive.129  Unity thus can only be 
supported, if at all, on functionalist grounds.  Unitarians rely on the relative 
accountability of the unitary executive as their major functional 
justification.130  However, information integrity, including transparency, is 
a necessary condition to achieving constitutional accountability values.131  
Logic and history—including much recent history—demonstrate that unity 
can and often does undermine information integrity.  As such, it undermines 
accountability by enabling executive branch personnel to hide or 
manipulate facts that would help the public or the other branches to judge 
their actions.132
 
  Furthermore,  
one need not agree that unity plainly undermines accountability to share 
[the] conclusion that the accountability argument for unity is flawed. . . . 
So long as it is reasonably arguable that unity undermines, rather than 
bolsters, accountability, then unity fails to so plainly further 
accountability as to support an unyielding, categorical unity directive.133
 
   
From all of this it follows not that Congress may fracture unity as much as 
it likes, but rather that it has a fair amount of discretion to impose checks on 
the President, including by fracturing unity, subject to case-by-case 
balancing as to whether Congress has gone so far as to defeat accountability 
in any given case.134
The Obama Administration’s first two years provide additional support 
for the notion that unity does not necessarily advance accountability and 
that it can undermine it by compromising information integrity.  We have 
seen, for example, that even in the context of an information integrity 
initiative spearheaded by the President personally and very publicly 
managed through a White House office (the OSTP), it can be difficult if not 
impossible to discover who did what and who knew what when.
 
135
 
 129. Kitrosser, supra note 
  We are 
also reminded that presidential control over executive subordinates and 
actions, either personally or through OMB or other offices, can translate 
37, at 618–34. 
 130. Id. at 613; Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1746–47. 
 131. Kitrosser, supra note 58, at 1760. 
 132. Id. at 1768–69. 
 133. Id. at 1743–44. 
 134. Id. at 1755–56 (reaching this conclusion, and explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court 
embraced essentially the same approach in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)). 
 135. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
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into information pre-clearance power.136  Such power poses risks that 
scientific information will be cloaked or manipulated for political ends, thus 
compromising the ability of the public or the other branches to assess 
agency actions.137  Such power also threatens the ability of whistleblowers 
to check the executive branch from within by exposing the manipulation of 
science or other forms of corruption or incompetence.138
In short, the events of the last two years do nothing to dispel the notion, 
and provide further evidence, that the trappings of unity can undermine 
information integrity and accountability.  This fact remains true even if 
unity can positively impact accountability under certain conditions, for 
example, through White House demands that subordinates act with greater 
transparency.  Indeed, that unity in some cases can positively impact 
accountability and in other cases can undermine it is perfectly consistent 
with the notion that Congress must have discretion, within functional 
bounds, to leave the conditions of unity intact or to disrupt them in any 
given case.  Such discretion enables Congress to consider whether unity 
will help or hinder accountability under the circumstances addressed in 
particular pieces of legislation. 
 
C.  Lesson #2:  How Statutory Schemes Might Supplement and Constrain 
Presidential Administration To Enhance Information Integrity 
That presidential administration is a mixed bag for scientific integrity not 
only is demonstrated by experience, but makes quite a bit of sense.  On the 
one hand, the President has a built-in structural capacity to act in secret, and 
ample motivation to see the administrative state reach scientific conclusions 
that are politically convenient.  Furthermore, “[p]residential control is a 
‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”139  So long as presidential control effectively means 
control by hundreds of political appointees,140
 
 136. See supra notes 
 the potential for intentional 
or incidental obfuscation as to who took or ordered given actions and why 
is substantial.  The potential for obfuscation is further bolstered by the use 
and shadow effects of doctrines like executive privilege and state secrets 
privilege.  On the other hand, the President has unique access to national 
95–96 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 97–104 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 139. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael B. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:  
A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006). 
 140. As this discussion reflects, unitarians often treat the President and the White House 
staff as interchangeable.  On this view, power that belongs to the President as head of the 
unitary executive branch may be exercised by White House officers to whom the President 
delegates power.  Yet the notion that the President may freely delegate his “unitary” power 
has not gone unchallenged.  In his contribution to this Symposium issue, Professor Saiger 
argues that a unitarian reading of the Constitution does not encompass a presidential freedom 
to “deputize agents on his staff to wield executive power on his behalf just as he could wield 
it himself.” Aaron Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White 
House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011).  Similarly, Saikrishna Prakash has argued 
that the Constitution is unitarian but that it does not license the President to “delegate his 
own power to others.”  Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s 
Unitary Executive, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 701, 716 (2009). 
2420 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
and international bully pulpits and political incentives to associate himself 
with transparency, accountability, and the rule of law.  And neither 
Congress nor the bureaucracy is immune to capture from financial or 
ideological interests or to the pull of “bent science.”141
Simply put, presidential administration has a potential to further 
information integrity that should be harnessed, but it also has a capacity for 
information control that calls for statutory checking.  As an initial matter, 
some statutory checks might face (and in some cases have faced) objections 
on the grounds that they violate executive unity or the President’s 
constitutional power to keep secrets.  With respect to unity, above I 
referenced other work in which I argue that the Constitution does not 
impose a categorical unity directive.  With respect to presidential claims of 
a constitutional right to keep secrets, I have elsewhere detailed my view that 
such claims are constitutionally unsound, and that Congress in fact has a 
broad constitutional power to create statutes imposing disclosure 
requirements on the President or otherwise checking executive secrecy.
  Presidential 
leadership thus has the potential to serve as a real counter-force, both 
rhetorically and through directives, against the pull of information control 
within or outside of the executive branch. 
142
A key starting point is the notion that external checks and internal checks 
often depend on one another, a point on which scholars have increasingly 
focused.
  
Once we move past the constitutional arguments, we are returned to the 
realm of policy, and the question of what statutory measures are desirable, 
assuming that Congress has the constitutional power to create them.  While 
a detailed set of proposals is beyond the scope of this Article, the remainder 
of this section offers some guiding principles and examples. 
143  For example, it has been noted, quite properly, that 
whistleblowers can serve as very important internal checks—or checks 
from within the executive branch—by exposing incompetence or corruption 
within agencies.144  At the same time, externally imposed whistleblower 
protections are necessary if whistleblowers are not to be at the mercy of the 
very executive branch that they seek to criticize.145  Thus, whistleblower 
rights to reveal information directly to congresspersons or to receive 
meaningful remedies from juries—despite opposition to both from the 
Obama Administration146
 
 141. See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 
—are examples of important, externally imposed 
and externally administered protections. 
14, at 34–38. 
 142. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and Free Speech, 2008 
U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 916–18. 
 143. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability:  A Case Study of the 
Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. REV. 357, 362–64, 376–89; Seth F. 
Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1011, 1016–21, 1033, 1045–46, 1056–59 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, The 
Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 
EMORY L.J. 423, 425–26, 439–52 (2009). 
 144. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 143, at 385–86. 
 145. Id. at 385–87. 
 146. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
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Another example of internal checks that can be fostered externally is the 
existence of agency scientists who candidly share their analysis with the 
public.  As we have seen, internal political interference—through 
mechanisms such as OMB clearance or public affairs office clearance 
within science agencies—can deeply hinder these checks.  While the 
Obama Administration has made some internal strides on this front, the 
strides have been uneven and there is still a long way to go.  Furthermore, if 
protections are purely a function of internal policies, then they can be 
altered at any point by the current administration or by future ones when 
they prove inconvenient.  External protections are thus necessary 
supplements to internal measures.  Such protections might, for example, 
forbid pre-clearance requirements for scientific testimony or media contact 
by political offices. 
A related internal check that Congress sometimes imposes via statute is 
expertise.  That is, Congress at times has required—despite administration 
objections based on executive unity147—minimum hiring qualifications for 
appointees who exercise discretionary executive authority.  Scientific 
expertise as a hiring qualification has been emphasized by the Obama 
Administration.148  The Administration has made some high-profile hires to 
demonstrate its commitment to the same—perhaps most notably, appointing 
the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven Chu to head the Department of 
Energy.149
External checks not directly linked to internal ones also have important 
roles to play.  Transparency statutes such as FOIA and the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act can help the public and the press discern whether extra-
scientific pressures were placed on agencies conducting scientific analyses.  
Statutes outlining agency procedural requirements, particularly the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) with its direct procedural mandates 
and the record-keeping norms to which it has given rise,
  Nonetheless, this is an area in which statutory requirements can 
serve as external bulwarks, particularly for positions less high-profile than 
Chu’s that get little public attention but deeply influence agencies and their 
practices. 
150 also help 
observers track the various inputs underlying agency decisions and 
scientific justifications.  Currently, however, there are significant gaps in 
statutory coverage.  The APA has been construed by the Supreme Court not 
to apply to the President.151
 
 147. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 721–24 (2007) (citing signing statements 
by President Clinton and President George W. Bush objecting to minimum qualification 
requirements for Presidential appointees). 
  Furthermore, administrations have 
suggested—sometimes as a matter of statutory interpretation, sometimes as 
 148. See Scientific Integrity Memo, supra note 1. 
 149. See Dr. Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy, DEP’T OF ENERGY, 
http://www.energy.gov/organization/dr_steven_chu.htm. 
 150. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 881–900 (2007) (describing and criticizing some of the procedural 
requirements that courts have inferred from the APA). 
 151. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796, 800–01 (1992). 
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a matter of constitutional interpretation, and often as both—that statutory 
openness and other procedural requirements do not apply to White House 
offices.152
D.  Lesson #3:  Seizing Political Momentum Toward Information Integrity 
  The constitutional arguments must, of course, be addressed as 
they arise.  On the statutory front, such gaps that do exist should be closed.  
Indeed, as some of the examples cited in this Article illustrate, it often is 
particularly difficult to trace influences that emanate from the OMB or 
other White House offices. 
As discussed in Part III, the start of the Obama Administration appeared 
to be a historical moment in which the issue of information integrity had 
real political resonance.  With the new President and Congress both hailing 
from the Democratic party and riding a backlash against the outgoing 
Republican administration, the stage seemed set for information integrity 
reforms to take hold, paralleling the wave of transparency measures and 
other “good government” reforms that followed the scandals of Watergate. 
The failure of developments thus far to live up to initial hopes can be 
attributed partly to political and institutional changes of the past several 
decades.  For one thing, as political scientist Stephen Skowronek points out, 
the thickening of institutions that surround the presidency—such as the 
growth of the White House bureaucracy—makes it more difficult for 
presidents to make sharp breaks from the practices of their predecessors, 
even in “reconstruction” periods when new presidents take the reins from 
widely repudiated Presidents of a different party.153  Furthermore, certain 
constitutional theories of presidential power, including executive privilege 
and related theories of a broad presidential right to keep secrets, have grown 
increasingly influential and ubiquitous.154  Indeed, such arguments are 
sometimes used as bases to avoid passing legislation in the first place.155  
Additionally, the increasingly partisan nature of Congress makes it difficult 
in periods of divided government for Presidents and Congress to get on the 
same page politically to pass legislation.156
 
 152. For example, the Obama White House (echoing a similar incident in the Bush 
administration) claimed a constitutional right, as well a statutory exemption, to withhold 
information from a group that invoked FOIA to request “records of visits by coal executives 
in order to analyze whether these executives influenced the administration’s energy policy.”  
While the administration ultimately relented and agreed to disclose the records, the incident 
is a reminder of the practical significance of constitutional and statutory arguments as a 
means for administrations to avoid disclosing information, and the continuity of such 
arguments across administrations and parties. See Union of Concerned Scientists, White 
House Visitor Logs and Lack of Transparency in the Obama Administration, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/abuses_of_science/white-house-visitor-logs-
and.html. 
  And in periods of unified 
 153. See supra note 117. 
 154. See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 110; Heidi Kitrosser, It Came From Beneath the 
Twilight Zone:  Wiretapping and Article II Imperialism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1405–06 
(2010). 
 155. Kitrosser, supra note 110; Kitrosser, supra note 154, at 1430–33. 
 156. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2316, 2332–34, 2339 (2006). 
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government, it is difficult to build political momentum for legislation that 
would meaningfully constrain the President.157
The question, from the perspective of information integrity advocates, is 
how moments of political promise—like that which greeted the start of the 
Obama Administration—might be seized to lock in both meaningful 
internal changes and statutory protections.  For one thing, advocates must 
engage constitutional debates over presidential power in all three branches 
of government and in the realm of public discourse.  Beyond the 
constitutional questions, advocates should pay careful attention to 
calibrating the specificity of proposed statutory protections.  As noted in 
Part III, opinion polls reflect that while Americans support information 
integrity in the abstract, they grow more equivocal as questions become 
more specific.
 
158
Presidential administration and congressional initiative can also play off 
of each other dynamically.  In a period of divided government, this might 
amount to inter-branch one-upmanship.  For example, congresspersons 
might call the President on transparency promises, urging him to sign 
legislation that constrains him in the interest of furthering his own pledges.  
In a period of unified government, Congress might wait and see as 
administrative experimentation takes place—for instance, as agencies draw 
up scientific integrity plans in response to a broad presidential directive—
and then step in to legislatively codify or supplement some of the more 
appealing plans. 
  Legislation thus must be identified broadly with values of 
scientific integrity or transparency, while being specific enough to provide 
meaningful, enforceable rules.  In periods of unified government, advocates 
might pitch such legislation in a manner both cooperative and 
challenging—urging Congress and the President to put force behind their 
words by encoding their shared ideals in statute.  In periods of divided 
government, the pitch might be more partisan in nature—appealing to 
Congress’ desire to constrain an opposite-party President, while appealing 
to the President’s desire to cultivate an image as one who will cross the 
aisle to support values of transparency and the rule of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution leaves Congress much discretion to pass statutes—
contingent, of course, on presidential approval or two-thirds support in each 
chamber—that protect scientific integrity in government.  One of the most 
ubiquitous constitutional arguments against such protections is that they 
violate the President’s power to control administration through a unitary 
executive branch.  Unity is demanded, say unitarians, by constitutional 
accountability values.  As we have seen, events in past administrations and 
now in the Obama Administration demonstrate that unity does not always 
conduce to accountability.  In this, experiences of the past two years echo 
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 158. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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earlier events that undermine the accountability-based argument for a 
unitary executive. 
At the same time, one ought not to write off as meaningless the several 
high-profile transparency and scientific integrity pledges of the Obama 
campaign and administration or the excitement that such pledges generated 
among segments of the President’s political base.  These phenomena offer 
lessons in their own right.  They suggest that transparency and scientific 
integrity have some political resonance, that Presidents and presidential 
candidates are aware of this fact, and that the presidential bully pulpit and 
the tools of presidential administration can be harnessed to promote and 
foster these values. 
For advocates of transparency and scientific integrity, the two-fold trick 
is in figuring out how to sustain political momentum toward such values 
and how to harness the advantages of presidential administration without 
facilitating White House information control.  As this Article’s tentative 
reflections on both points suggest, a partial response to both questions is for 
advocates to place sustained political pressure on Congress and on the 
President to create external and internal protections alike.  Nor is politics 
detached from the constitutional arguments referenced throughout this 
Article—that is, unitary executive theory, theories favoring presidential 
secrecy privileges, and arguments against both theories.  Such arguments 
play important roles in executive and congressional debates over whether to 
pass, and how to administer, legislation.  Furthermore, the modern 
influence of presidentialist theories is due in no small part to concerted 
movements within and outside of the executive branch.159
 
  Like 
presidentialists, then, transparency and scientific integrity advocates must 
continue to engage the political branches as well as the judiciary.  They 
must do so not only to champion the policy advantages of internal and 
external checking mechanisms, but to articulate the fallacies of the 
presidentialist constitutional theories that would block much external 
checking. 
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